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The Court, in Singer Transfer Co. v. Buck Glass Co."'
was apparently in accord with the above contention. In
that opinion it was said,
"Where damage to property is caused by the operation of an instrument within the exclusive control of
defendant under circumstances which justify an inference that it would not have occurred had defendant
exercised ordinary care, negligence may be presumed
as a rational inference from such facts. Whether that
presumption falls under the classification of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or that of the effect of circumstantial evidence is a mere matter of indexing, but the
principle itself is firmly established that where the
known facts justify a rational inference of defendant's
negligence, such negligence may be presumed."
Because the term has no fixed meaning in different jurisdictions and because it gives rise to a temptation to regard
it as an end in itself instead of a convenient way of characterizing the standards ordinarily requisite for the application of a well established rule of evidence, the discontinuance of the use of the phrase would probably simplify
the process of reaching a sound result. When the phrase
is so firmly embedded that its frequent use by counsel
may be expected to continue, it is a healthy sign to see the
Court, as in the Singer Transfer Co. case78 so clearly analogize its character as being merely a classification under
which a given result is described or indexed.
BANK'S OBLIGATION TO PERFORM STOP PAYMENT ORDER RECEIVED PRIOR TO
CHARGING DEPOSITOR'S ACCOUNT
Keller v. Fredericktown Savings Institution'
Action was brought by plaintiff-appellant against the
Fredericktown Savings Institution, appellee, a bank located
at Frederick, Maryland, which paid appellant's check after
payment thereon had been stopped. On September 20,
1947, appellant drew an uncertified check on said bank
payable to the order of the Allied Realty Corp.; on receipt
the payee deposited it in the Bank of Bethesda, Bethesda,
Maryland. This check was received by appellee's treasurer
7 169 Md. 358, 181 A. 672 (1935).
78 Ibid.

' 66 A. 2d 924 Md. (1949).
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by mail from the Bank of Bethesda on the morning of
September 23, 1947. The following instructions were enclosed: "Check by Miriam Strouse Keller payable Allied
Realty Corp. Upon receipt, please wire if paid or if not
pad-collect." The treasurer called the President of the
Bethesda bank by telephone and told him the check was
good and he was "remitting for it". The treasurer then
drew a draft on the Riggs National Bank of Washington
for the amount of the check less service charges, prepared
it for mailing, and placed it in the mail basket for delivery
to the Post Office. He then recorded the draft and made
out a credit slip to the Riggs National Bank for the amount
involved. The check was placed in a tray along with other
such items to await processing through the proof machine
before going on to the bookkeeping department where they
would be actually "cancelled" and charged to depositors'
accounts. Around noon that same day appellant called at the
bank and signed a form to stop payment on this check. This
was provided by one of appellee's officials, who knew at the
time that the check in question was in the bank. Appellant's
account had not been charged on the ledger of the bank
at the time the order to stop payment was given. The
check was thereafter paid. On suit by appellant, the lower
Court ruled the bank was not liable. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the action of the lower Court and entered judgment for the appellant for the amount of the
check and interest. The sole question presented was
whether or not, under the circumstances, the bank had a
right to pay the check to the Bethesda Bank and charge
the same to the appellant's account.
It is well settled that a check in itself does not operate
as an assignment of any part of the money deposited with
the drawee.' The relationship between the bank and its
depositors is that of debtor and creditor and a check drawn
by the depositor is an exercise by him of his contractual
right to draw upon the fund loaned by him to the bank. The
check is an order by the depositor to the bank to pay the
designated sum to order or to bearer. It may be countermanded if the stop payment order is presented to the bank
prior to its discharge of the check by actual payment or to
its performance of acts constituting an acceptance or certification of the check and legally binding it to remit.'
In this case there was clearly no acceptance of the
check since the Maryland Code requires that such an
2

Md. Code (1939) Art. 13, Sec. 208.
C. J. S. Banks and Banking, See. 344, 602.
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acceptance must be in writing.' Although there might have
been an acceptance, had the Fredericktown Savings Institution replied by telegram as requested by the Bank of
Bethesda,' a telephone conversation that a check will be
accepted for payment does not constitute an acceptance on
which the payor bank could be subjected to suit by the collecting bank.' Therefore, since the Fredericktown Savings
Institution was not legally bound by the telephone conversation of its treasurer, this act without more could not
serve as a basis for a denial of the depositor's right to
countermand by a stop payment order.
With the acceptance question disposed of, the court
turned to the question of whether or not the bank had
performed acts constituting payment prior to the receipt
of the stop order. Although the check was in the bank at
the time and a draft had been drawn for the remittance,
the depositor had not yet been charged with the amount
of the check on the books of the bank. The question thus
resolved itself to a question of fact as to the exact point
of time in the bank's handling of a check when it could be
said that discharge by payment had taken place. The Court
took the position that the acts done by the Fredericktown
Savings Institution in this case were merely acts of preparation, indicating an unexecuted intention to pay but not
in themselves constituting a completed payment." And,
further, that until the transaction was actually entered
upon the ledger, charging the depositor's account with
the amount of the check, there was no discharge by payment and nothing to preclude an effective stop payment
'Md. Code (1939) Art. 13, Secs. 151 and 204. Under the provisions of
the May 1949 draft of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, Sec. 3-409,
347, all acceptances would be required to be written on the draft and
"collateral" acceptances even though in writing would be eliminated.
I See Snyder & Blankfard Co., Inc. v. Farmers' Bank of Tifton, 178 Md.
601, 16 A. 2d 837 (1940) indicating that the requirement that an acceptance
be in writing is satisfied by a telegram.
I Gruber v. Bank of America, 127 Misc. 132, 215 N. Y. S. 222 (1926). See
also Ballen & Friedman v. Bank of Kremlin, 37 Okl. 112, 130 P. 539, 44
L. R. A., N. S., 621 (1913) negating the possibility of a contention that
the payor bank, having informed the payee bank that the check was good,
is estopped to deny liability, on the ground that the Negotiable Instruments
Law was intended to fix and settle the rights of the parties so far as they
are affected by its operation, and therefore, the ordinary principles of law
do not apply.
I See Hewit v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 179 P. 248, 251 (1919)
from which the Court of Appeals quoted on this point and which recognized that the act of the bank in mailing a draft covering the amount of
the check to the collecting bank could not be considered as payment in
the absence of any entry of the transaction on the books of the bank. See
also BauTEL's, BRANNAN

comment on this case.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (7th ed.) 1233 for
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order by the depositor. The Court, therefore, held that at
the time appellant gave the order to stop payment the
bank had neither certified or otherwise accepted the instrument nor paid the check, and thus had no right thereafter
to pay the check and charge the same to appellant's account.' Although it was not mentioned in the brief of either
party or by the Court in its decision, this holding would
seem to be impelled by the Bank Collection Code which has
been statute law of Maryland since 1929 and which provides
in part: "Where the item is received by mail, by a solvent
drawee or payor bank, it shall be deemed paid when the
amount is finally charged to the account of the maker or
drawer."'
It is often argued, as it was by the appellee bank in
this case, that when the check is received by mail, preliminary acts such as the preparation of a draft, the drawing
of a credit memo, the placing of the check on file to be
debited and other such office procedures should constitute
payment of the check rather than the final entries of the
bookkeepers. Although it is true that the designation of
the bookkeeping entry as the critical point of time in the
discharge of the instrument is an arbitrary one, it seems
that the judicial and statutory selection of the later rather
than the earlier point of time is more to be desired as a
matter of policy. The right of the depositor to stop payment
is a valuable one and a service which the depositor is entitled to receive. It should not be sacrificed, even in part,
by a rule which would arbitrarily preclude its exercise at
a time when it would still be possible for the bank, by
exercise of reasonable diligence, to protect the depositor
from injury, without subjecting itself to liability.
The May 1949 draft of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code clearly recognizes the importance of the stop
payment right and comments that "The inevitable occasional losses through failure to stop should be borne by
the banks as a cost of the business of banking, and to
the extent that they cannot be covered by a charge made
for the service should be covered by banker's insurance,
the cost of which is included in the charges made to all
a In reaching this decision the court relied upon Exchange Bank v. Sutton Bank, 78 Md. 577, 28 A. 563, 564, 23 L. R. A. 173 (1894) ; First National
Bank v. First National Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S. W. 965 (1913) ; Sokoloff
v. National City Bank, 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745 (1928); Hunt v.
Security State Bank, supra, n. 6; Guardian National Bank v. Huntington
County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N. E. 388. 92 A. L. R. 1056 (1933) ;
Davidson v. Allen, 47 Idaho 405, 276 P. 43, 68 A. L. R. 856 (1929): 9
C. J. S., Banks & Banking, Sec. 344, 692.
' Md. Code (1939) Art. 11, See. 114.
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depositors."' 10 And yet, the proposed new sections would
completely nullify the law as laid down in this and other
cases by providing that in the case of an instrument received by mail the stop payment order must have been
presented prior to the receipt of the instrument" and that,
"an instrument properly payable when received takes
priority for payment over all subsequently received stop
orders.""
Were these two sections to be adopted and applied to
situations such as the one here presented, they would allow
the bank to deny to a depositor the right to protect his
deposit by a stop payment order merely because the check
had already been received, even though it would still be
quite possible for the bank, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, to stop the payment without incurring any liability upon itself.
Such a change in the law does not seem justified in the
light of its effect in shifting from the bank to the depositor
the burden of a loss resulting from the bank's failure to
stop payment when the direction was received after the
receipt of the check but before acceptance or payment.
Policy-wise it would seem to be more desirable that the
rule as laid down in Keller v. FredericktownSavings Institution" and by the Bank Collection Code as it presently
exists 4 remain the controlling law in such cases.
AMERICAN LAW INsTrrrE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

May 1949 draft,

Sec. 3-415, Comment 2, 359.
n Ibid., Sec. 3-415, "Stopping Payment ... (2) The direction must be received at such time and in such manner as to afford a reasonable opportunity to act on it, and in the ca8e of an instrument presented by mail or
through a clearing house before receipt of the in8trument". (Italics supplied.) Observe that an adoption of this proposal would Involve a change
of the existing provision of the Bank Collection Code, op. cit. supra, n. 9. It
Is interesting to note that the italicized portion of this section did not appear
in proposed drafts prior to May 1949.
U Ibid., Sec. 3-629, "Obligation of Payor Bank, (1) . . . an Item properly
payable when received takes priority for payment over all subsequently
received stop orders, notices or legal process . . ." The comment on this
provision, expresses its purpose as being, "To narrow the risk of loss to
the owner of an item by: (1) giving his item priority over garnishments
or other notices against the drawer's account served after arrival of his
Item . . ." Although this is a commendable purpose it does not seem
entirely necessary in the case of stop payment orders by the drawer of
a check. Where the drawer disputes the right of the payee to the proceeds
of the check, his power to relegate the payee to a suit at law in which the
rights of the parties can be decided need not be terminated by the mere
act of presentment in the absence of abtual payment.
11Supra, n. 1.
1"Op. cit., supra, n. 9.

